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"practical certainty" he would have been so exposed.18 As illustrative,
let us take the instant case. The death of decedent should have been com-
pensable unless it appeared to be certain that even though he had not been
employed, he, as a reasonable man, would still have been exposed to the
rays of the sun for hours at a time and engaged in similar muscular activity.1 9
While no compensation case has been found expressly recognizing this fact,
it is an accepted principle of causation, and is as applicable and socially
desirable in this field of the law as in those involving tortious acts.
C. D. L
CORPORATIONS-RATIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED AcTS--IMPuTAToN OF
NoTIcE.-Defendant, a plumbing contractor, performed services for McKnight,
who was a stockholder and director of the plaintiff corporation, and who
for fourteen years had been in charge of the retail store operated by the
corporation. Defendant and McKnight entered into a contract whereby
defendant was to purchase supplies from the corporation and these were to
be set off against McKnight's indebtedness to defendant. The purchases
extended over a period of several years, during which time defendant never
received a bill from the corporation, but regular invoices were sent. This
action was to recover for the goods sold and delivered. Defendant counter-
claimed, alleging that the corporation was bound by the contract made by
McKnight. Held, by acquiescing in the agreement, the corporation had
ratified it.1
The principal question involved in a discussion of this case is whether
the agreement was ratified by the corporation. It is true that an agreement
can be ratified by acquiescence. 2  However, ratification by acquiescence
requires that the one ratifying have notice of the agreement. 3 In the present
case it was not shown that anyone connected with the corporation, except
McKnight and possibly those working under him, had any actual knowledge
of the agreement. How, then, could the corporation have notice of the agree-
ment? In the principal case, the court held that directors of a corporation
18 Harper, supra, Sec. 109, p. 255.
19 Physical exertion, as well as the heat from the sun, is a contributing
cause of sunstroke. Draper, Legal Medicine, p. 461.
1 Fayette Lumber Co. v. Faught (Ind. App., 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 132.
2 Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App.
179, 161 N. E. 389; Hoosier Lumber Co. v. Spear (1934), 99 Ind. App. 532,
189 N. E. 633; National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick (1916), 63 Ind. App. 54,
112 N. E. 559; American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1905), 37 Ind. App. 386, 73
N. E. 608; Washburn-Crosby Mill Co. v. Brown (1913), 56 Ind. App. 104,
104 N. E. 997; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner (1910), 47 Ind. App.
621, 93 N. E. 1014; Outing Kumfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey (1920), 74 Ind. App. 286,
125 N. E. 234.
3 National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick (1916), 63 Ind. App. 54, 112 N. E.
559; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner (1910), 47 Ind. App. 621, 93
N. E. 1014; Outing Kumfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey (1920), 74 Ind. App. 286, 125
N. E. 234; Crowder v. Reed (1881), 80 Ind. 1; Crumpacker v. Jeffry (1916),
63 Ind. App. 621, 115 N. E. 62; Kline v. Indiana Trust Co. (1920), 74- Ind.
App. 351, 125 N. E. 434.
RECENT CASE NOTES
are presumed to know that which it is their duty to know and which they
have the means of knowing.4 Now, was it the duty of the directors to know
the exact nature of an agreement between a purchaser in the ordinary course
of business and its manager? The obvious answer would be that such a
requirement would impose too great a burden on directors who receive little,
if any, compensation for their services. It would seem that directors should
not be required to investigate every transaction, but that they could assume
that such transactions would be regular. Directors are bound to exercise
ordinary care and diligence in the discharge of their duties. 5 It is possible
that the directors were somewhat negligent in allowing defendant's account
to run over a period of years, but even this is a questionable matter, for the
account was not large and the directors might reasonably assume that their
manager knew defendant and believed him to be a good risk.6
In the present case the court said that the law imputes to a corporation
knowledge of facts which its directors ought to know in the exercise of
ordinary diligence, in discharge of their official duties, when imputation of
such knowledge is necessary to protect the rights of ihird persons. As a
general proposition, this may be a true statement of the law.7 However, it
appears inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the following reasons:
First, as previously shown, the directors could hardly be said to have the
duty to acquire knowledge of facts regarding a transaction in the ordinary
course of the business. Second, while it is true that notice to an agent of a
corporation, relating to any matter of which he has the management and
control, is notice to the corporation,S this rule is inapplicable to cases where
the officer is acting in his individual capacity in a transaction with the
corporaton,9 or where he is adversely interested,1 0 or where he is participat-
ing in a fraud on the corporation, 1 1 in which cases notice will not be imputed.
4 Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App.
179, 161 N. E. 389; Hoosier Lumber Co. v. Spear (1934), 99 Ind. App. 532,
189 N. E. 633.
5 General Rubber Co. v. Benedict (1915), 215 N. Y. i8, 109 N. E. 96;
Hun v. Cary (1880), 82 N. Y. 65; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Munday
(1921), 297 Ill. 555, 131 N. E. 103; Delano v. Case (1887), 121 Ill. 247, 12
N. E. 676.
6 Briggs v. Spaulding (1891), 141 U. S. 132, 11 S. Ct. 924; Bates v. Dresser
(1920), 251 U. S. 524-, 40 S. Ct. 247. -
7 Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App.
179, 161 N. E. 389; National Life Ins. Co. v. Minch (1873), 53 N. Y. 144..
8 Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App.
179, 161 N. E. 389; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner (1910), 47 Ind.
App. 621, 93 N. E. 1014; Huber Manufacturing Co. v. Blessing (1912), 51
Ind. App. 89, 99 N. E. 132; Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jackman (1905),
35 Ind. App. 1, 73 N. E. 730; Supreme Court of Honor v. Sullivan (1901),
26 Ind. App. 60, 59 N. E. 37; Peckham v. Hendren (1881), 76 Ind. 47.
9Peckham v. Hendren (1881), 76 Ind. 47; Ayers v. Green Gold Mining
Co. (1897), 116 Cal. 333, 48 Pac. 221.
10 Innerarity v. Bank (1885), 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282; American Surety
Co. v. Pauly (1898), 170 U. S. 133, 18 S. Ct. 552; Benedict v. Arnoux (1898),
154 N. Y. 715, 49 N. E. 326; Seaverno v. Presbyterian Hospital (1898), 173
I1. 414, 50 N. E. 1079; Hadden v. Dooley (1899), 34 C. C. A. 338, 92 Fed. 274.
11Henry v. Allen (1896), 151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. 355; Innerarity v. Bank
(1885), 139 Mass. 332, 1 N. E. 282; Allen v. South Boston R. Co. (1889),
150 Mass. 200, 22 N. E. 917; Corcoran v. Snow Cattle Co. (1890), 151 Mass.
74, 23 N. E. 727.
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Third, the imputation of knowledge would not be necessary to protect the
rights of the third person in the present case, for the third person knew that
the manager was attempting to use corporate assets to pay his private obliga-
tions. This, it seems, should be sufficient to show that the third person was
not entitled to the benefit of the imputation even though he was not actually
participating in a scheme to defraud the corporation.12
In the present case, the court relies on and quotes extensively from the
case of Seymour Improvement Co. v. Fiking Sprinkler Co.,13 which case is
easily distinguished. In the Viking case, the president executed the contract
for the installation of the sprinkler system and bills were sent from time to
time as the work progressed. The directors could hardly escape having
knowledge of the installation and that the corporation was looked to for
payment. Further, the president and secretary were acting in good faith
and their knowledge, therefore, could be imputed to the corporation. Also,
the third party was acting in such a way as to be entitled to protection, and
the corporation received the benefits of the contract. The court relied, also,
on the case of Hoosier Lumber Co. v. Spear.14 The facts in the Spear case
were almost identical with those of the principal case: the president of the
corporation in each case was paying a personal debt with the corporate
assets. However, in the Spear case, it was shown that both of the other
directors, the president being the third, had knowledge of and agreed to the
contract, though no formal resolution was adopted. The court further found
that the officers believed the agreement to be for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. Thus, it would appear that, while the court announced rules of law
which are generally accepted, the rules thus announced are inapplicable to
the facts of the instant case.
R. E. M.
TAXATION-JURISDICTION TO TAX TRUST PROPERTY-THE TRUST DEVICE AS
AN INSTRUMENTALITY FOR AvOIDING TAxATION.-Appellant, a resident of Indi-
ana, assigned, transferred, and delivered certain stocks to the First National
Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, on February 28, 1930, to be held in trust, naming
herself, her husband, daughters, sons-in-law, or their survivors, as bene-
ficiaries. The intangible subject matter of the trust was made the basis of an
assessment against the appellant, and was listed on the tax duplicate in July,
1932, as omitted property for the years 1920 to 1932, inclusive.
Held: Since the title vested in the trustee, who was a resident of Ohio,
the property cannot be made the subject of a tax by the state of Indiana.
Since the appellant did, in fact, part with title to, and control of, the property,
her object in so doing, although one of avoiding taxation, is of no importance.1
12 Persons contracting with a corporation are bound to know the law limit-
ing the powers of its agents to contract. Pine Civil Township v. Huber
Manufacturing Co. (1882), 83 Ind. 121.
13 (1927), 87 Ind. App. 179, 161 N. E. 389.
14 (1934), 99 Ind. App. 532, 189 N. E. 633.
1 Lewis R. Johnston v. State of Indiana (Ind., 1937), 8 N. E. (2d) 590.
